ABSTRACT
Introduction
The analysis of mixed market models that incorporate state-owned public firms has been performed by many researchers, such as [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] . 1 However, these studies consider mixed market models in which state-owned firms compete with profit-maximizing capitalist firms, and do not include labor-managed firms.
Mixed market models that incorporate labor-managed firms have also been studied by many researchers, such as [22] [23] [24] [25] [26] [27] [28] [29] [30] [31] [32] [33] [34] . 2 However, these studies consider mixed market models in which labor-managed firms compete against profit-maximizing capitalist firms, and do not include state-owned firms.
Some studies examine mixed market models with state-owned and labor-managed firms. For example, Delbono and Rossini [40] explore the creation of 1) a duopoly formed by a labor-managed firm and a state-owned firm in a Cournot-Nash setting, and 2) a horizontal merger between the same agents. In addition, Ohnishi [41] investigates the behaviors of a state-owned firm and a labormanaged firm in a two-stage mixed market model with capacity investment as a strategic instrument. There are few studies that examine mixed market models with state-owned and labor-managed firms.
Therefore, we consider a two-period mixed market model in which a state-owned firm and a labor-managed firm can hold inventories as a strategic device. 3 In the first period, each firm simultaneously and independently chooses how much it sells in the current market and the level of inventory it holds for the second-period market. We analyze the equilibrium of the mixed duopoly model, and show that the equilibrium in the second period occurs at the Stackelberg point where the state-owned firm is the leader.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the model. Section 3 gives supplementary explanations of the model. Section 4 analyzes the equilibrium of the model. Section 5 concludes the paper. All proofs are given in the appendix.
The Model
Let us consider a mixed market with one state-owned welfare-maximizing firm (firm 1) and one labor-managed profit-per-worker-maximizing firm (firm 2), producing perfectly substitutable goods. There is no possibility of entry or exit. In the remainder of this paper, subscripts 1 and 2 refer to firms 1 and 2, respectively, and superscripts 1 and 2 refer to periods 1 and 2, respectively. In addition, when and are used to refer to firms in an expression, they should be understood to refer to 1 and 2 with i j i j  . The price of each period is determined by , where is the aggregate sales of each period. We assume that and . The game runs as follows. In the first period, each firm simultaneously and independently chooses its first-period production
  and its first-period sales
1 See [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] for excellent surveys. 2 The pioneering work on a theoretical model of a labor-managed firm is conducted by Ward [35] . See also [36] [37] [38] [39] for excellent surveys. 3 For private market models with inventories as a strategic device, see Rotemberg and Saloner [42] and Matsumura [43] .
Firm 's inventory i
In the second period, firm 1's reaction function without inventory is defined by
and thus its best response is shown as follows: 
In the first period, the slope of the reaction function of firm 1 is -1. In the second period, the slope of the best response of firm 1 is -1 for Second, we derive firm 2's reaction functions from (4). In the first period, since there is no inventory available, firm 2's reaction function is defined by
In the second period, firm 2's reaction function without inventory is defined by
Since , , so that is positive; that is, is upward sloping. This means that firm 2 treats 
Equilibrium
In this section, we analyze the equilibrium outcomes of the mixed market model. The equilibrium in the first period is stated by the following proposition: Proposition 1. In the first-period of the mixed market model, the equilibrium coincides with the Cournot Nash solution without inventory .  decrease by deviating from the Cournot Nash solution, each firm has no incentive to do so, and therefore the equilibrium is at . . From (7), firm 1's reaction curve becomes the kinked bold lines. The intersection of firm 1's and firm 2's reaction curves gives us the equilibrium of the game. 2) The case in which only firm 2 can hold inventory First, consider . From (12), firm 2's reaction curve becomes the kinked bold broken lines. The reaction curves of both firms cross twice as in Figure 4 . We can see easily that and are stable solutions. That is, there are two stable solutions. However, we see that firm 2's profit per worker is higher at than at . lines, and firm 2's reaction curve becomes the kinked bold broken lines. The new reaction curves of both firms cross twice. We see easily that H and J are stable solutions. That is, there are two stable solutions. However, we see that firm 2's profit per worker is higher at than at these points. N The main result of this study is described by the following proposition:
Proposition 4. In the second period of the mixed market model, the equilibrium coincides with the Stackelberg solution where firm 1 is the leader. At equilibrium, firm 2's profit per worker is lower than in the Cournot mixed duopoly game without inventory.
Conclusions
We have considered a two-period mixed market model in which a state-owned firm and a labor-managed firm are allowed to hold inventories as a strategic device. We have then shown that the equilibrium in the second period occurs at the Stackelberg point where the stateowned firm is the leader and at equilibrium the labormanaged firm's profit per worker is lower than in the Cournot mixed duopoly game without inventory. As a result, we see that the introduction of inventory investment into the analysis of mixed market competition with state-owned and labor-managed firms is profitable for the state-owned firm while it is not profitable for the labor-managed firm.  be assumed to be continuous and concave in 2 2 s . The further a point on gets from firm 2's Stackelberg leader point, the more firm 2's profit per worker decreases. Hence, firm 2 does not choose Next, consider the possibility that firm 1 holds inventory as a strategic device. Our equilibrium concept is the subgame perfect equilibrium and all information in the model is common knowledge. Hence, firm 1 knows that firm 2 does not hold inventory as a strategic device whether firm 1 holds inventory or not. Lemma 1 states that firm 1's Stakelberg leader sales exceed its Cournot sales without inventory. From (7), we see that the equilibrium in the second period is decided by the value of 1 1 I . 1 1 I can take values of zero and above. In the first period, firm 1 chooses 
